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The Gulf (the “Arabian”, “Persian” or both!) includes large actual and potential 
producers of natural gas that can significantly alter the supply and demand 
picture, both within the region and internationally. A helping factor is the quite 
huge gas resource base in the area in relation to its actual and foreseeable level 
of demand. In other words, the Gulf that currently plays only a marginal role on 
the international gas market, has surely the potential to become a leading user 
and a world supplier of natural gas.
The spotlight has been focused on the numerous new natural gas export 
projects in the Gulf, and on the expected increase in the coming years in the 
region’s share of world gas exports. However, in the mean time, an important 
trend is taking place, consisting of the phenomenal increase in the Gulfs own 
natural gas consumption beyond the historical flat levels, which is giving rise to 
numerous gas distribution and consuming projects, and having a growing impact 
both on the structure o f energy demand in that part of the world and on the level 
of industrial development there.
Natural gas in the Gulf is actually viewed as one component of different 
strategies that consist of either using it domestically by some countries in order 
to reduce the local demand for crude oil and petroleum products and release 
more of them for export, or enhancing its output to increase their share in the 
global petroleum market and their financial receipts at a time when oil output 
and revenues are limited and constrained by output quotas and erratic prices. 
Some other countries are using their modest natural gas reserves to moderate 
their growing dependence upon liquid petroleum and thus to minimise their fuel 
imports and increase their energy self-sufficiency.
GAS RESERVES & RESOURCES
Proved natural gas reserves in the main Gulf countries (Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates—UAE, and Yemen) were estimated at 
51,511 billion cubic metres (Bern) as at the beginning of 2001, accounting for 
around 33 per cent of the world total. The 2000 gas proved reserves in the Gulf 
are alone sufficient, even if no further discoveries are made, to satisfy current 
worldwide consumption for more than 21 years. The bulk of Gulf gas reserves is 
concentrated in a small number of giant accumulations. The region has most 
probably nine supergiant fields (over 1,400 Bern of proved reserves each), out of 
twenty of those structures on our planet.
Even though, many believe that natural gas reserves in the Gulf have been 
underestimated — and underestimated to a large extent. In this context, a 
comparison of the ratio of crude oil reserves to those of natural gas on a regional 



























































































are more than twice as large as those of gas, the ratio being more than double 
that of the world as a whole, where oil and gas reserves are roughly equal. The 
Gulf might be a particularly “oily” province, but should the average global ratio 
of oil to gas reserves also hold for the region, then the potential for new gas 
discoveries is indeed vast.
In addition, the ratio of natural gas reserves in associated form (found and 
produced with crude oil) to non-associated (or free) gas in the Gulf is far higher 
than in most other regions of the world. Indeed, associated gas reserves in the 
area represent around 45 per cent of the total, leaving about 55 per cent of non- 
associated gas, whereas the average world ratio is some 15 per cent and 85 per 
cent respectively. This indicates that the potential for the discovery of significant 
volumes of non-associated gas in the region could be high.
Of course, those two ratios by themselves are not considered as sufficient 
grounds for surely asserting that natural gas reserves in the region are 
underestimated. However, there are a number of other factors, which suggest 
that actual reserves may be far greater than presently reported.
In fact, the huge increases of reserves in the Gulf over the last 35 years or 
so have been mainly the result of development work not of exploration 
activities. Exploration has become insignificant in the area. Out of some 1,780 
active exploration rigs in the world (excluding Eastern Europe) in 1999, about 
83 only were doing work in the region, a disproportionately small figure (around 
4.7 per cent of the total) in relation to the area’s existing petroleum reserve stock 
and production level, or discovery prospects.
Earlier exploration activities in the Gulf had mostly concentrated on the 
search for crude oil rather than natural gas and, as a result, gas discoveries had 
occurred more by chance than by design. In addition, discoveries of natural gas 
were often not accorded any value, and wells that encountered gas rather than oil 
were considered dry holes. Moreover, license areas found to contain large 
quantities of gas but no crude were most of the time relinquished by exploration 
companies.
Furthermore, gas fields that had been found were often not delineated or 
fully appraised, with only a preliminary estimate of reserves — if any — being 
made. There was little incentive to carry out the testing and further drilling 
necessary to evaluate the gas discovery at a time when natural gas was perceived 
as having little or no value, being regarded as an unwanted by-product of crude 




























































































Since nearly two decades only have natural gas reserves assumed any 
great importance, especially in those countries that also happen to have large 
reserves of crude oil, which is why it is only in recent years that exploration 
specifically targeted at discovering gas has been undertaken in many Gulf 
countries. This effort, although still timid, has involved drilling in previously 
identified, but unexplored, structures as well as undertaking the drilling of more 
sophisticated and deep wells. Deep horizons promise to hold more gas reserves 
than oil, and it is this fact that has discouraged the drilling of expensive deep 
wells in the past in many countries.
Many believe that a new and systematic review of the real potential of all 
the structures in the Gulf could spring many positive surprises, especially since 
the presence of giant and supergiant fields made it unnecessary in the past to 
mobilise very fine approaches. The proved natural gas reserves (and even those 
of crude oil) in the region would be therefore much higher when new and 
improved technologies are applied.
Besides, no serious exhaustive investigation has yet been attempted to 
identify the satellite accumulations of the main fields discovered in the Gulf. In 
the North Sea, for example, this type of approach has helped to double the 
producible reserves. Without drawing a parallel with this region, it is reasonable 
to assume that this approach should also benefit the Gulf.
As a result of all these factors one can be fairly confident that gas reserves 
in the Gulf will continue to grow and that the region will account for a far larger 
share of the world’s gas resources. However, considering the enormous potential 
of the Gulf, so little has been done so far to exploit its gas reserves. The 2000 
reserves to production ratio for natural gas in the area (production equals gross 
production minus reinjection), a measure often used as an indication of near- 
term supply capability, was relatively very high, covering around 245 years 
compared to only 61 years world-wide.
In addition to the concept of proved reserves, the undiscovered resources 
are getting more and more importance. They are defined as the resources of 
hydrocarbons believed to still exist and to be eventually discovered. This may be 
regarded as a purely geological concept that is not concerned with technological 
or economic constraints or with a time scale.
There is only one public source estimating the world’s petroleum 
resources, namely the US Geological Survey (USGS, Ch. Masters and others) 
that used to publish its figures once every three years. The latest resource figures 




























































































resources of the region at around 35604 Bern (mean), or 24 per cent of the world 
total.
GAS DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION & USE
Since the mid-1970s, producing countries especially in the Gulf have made 
considerable strides towards the exploitation of their natural gas reserves, 
especially the associated ones. A number of important gas projects have 
subsequently been undertaken or are currently under construction or study.
The development of associated gas reserves was encouraged despite the 
drawbacks of establishing a gas industry purely on the exploitation of such 
reserves. In fact, although the gas is freely available, its utilisation does not 
necessarily involve low costs; indeed associated gas may be economically less 
attractive than non-associated gas. In particular, associated gas has usually to go 
through a number of stages of gas/oil separation before it can be used and, 
consequently, it is only available at very low pressure — often little higher than 
atmospheric pressure — requiring the installation of compressors for its 
transmission. Non-associated gas, on the other hand, is generally available at 
much higher pressures.
Secondly, the rate of production of associated gas is dependent by 
definition on the rate of oil production, which can lead to great fluctuations in 
supply. In the case of Gulf OPEC member countries, the drop in their oil output 
during the first half of the 1980s had led to gas shortages at a time when gas had 
just become an important domestic fuel and industrial feedstock.
Concerted efforts followed aimed both at the development of known non- 
associated gas fields and the exploration and discovery of new ones in order to 
increase the production of dry gas, but these efforts have been hampered by 
falling revenues from oil exports and a related lack of investment capital.
Moreover, the development of non-associated gas fields in new regions, 
far from existing customers and therefore involving LNG or long-distance 
pipeline, is highly capital intensive — much more than the development of oil 
fields of comparable size. In these circumstances, developing such gas fields 
cannot be undertaken without the involvement of the gas purchasers. The 
complete chain of field development, surface facilities, processing plants, 
pipeline or LNG facilities, must be in place before gas can be produced. This in 
turn renders development of gas fields a very complicated operation, requiring a 
huge initial capital outlay before any returns can be earned, in direct contrast to 
the development of oil fields, where oil can be produced early on from 




























































































the investment expenditure. The provision of enough front-end capital is the 
main problem and, as is not the case in the development of oil fields, gas 
consumers often have to participate from the start in the necessary capital 
investment.
Unsurprisingly, in view of the above, the most significant gas-related 
developments in the Gulf are taking place in those countries (the UAE, Qatar 
and Oman) whose petroleum industries have been less politicised and where 
foreign investment in petroleum projects has not been ruled out. Another 
conclusion consists to say that major gas development projects in the region will 
have to be export-oriented if they are to secure external financing.
As a result of the above mentioned-development (associated gas burned at 
the flare, then recovered and used, and finally the development of dry non- 
associated gas), marketed natural gas production in the Gulf countries had 
doubled during the period 1990-2000 from around 105 Bern to about 210 Bern, 
representing 6.3 per cent and 8.7 per cent respectively of the world total. Even 
though, gas production in the region remains tiny in relation to its reserves. In 
2000, those Gulf countries produced only 0.4 per cent of its gas reserves, 
compared to the world’s ratio of 1.6 per cent.
However, most of the gas produced in the region is still in associated 
form. The gas output is thus linked to that of crude oil, which is not expected to 
dramatically increase beyond current levels in the foreseeable future. That surely 
leads to increasing serious constraints on domestic gas flows.
In the meantime, demand for natural gas in the Gulf countries, where 
much of the primary energy consumption relies on gas, is firmly growing. 
Natural gas in the region is used in many vital and politically-sensitive 
applications such as power generation, water desalination, industry and 
petrochemicals, gas-condensate recycling, oil field uplift, and enhanced 
recovery.
In fact, the bulk of marketed natural gas production in the Gulf is 
consumed locally. The domestic demand for natural gas there had increased by 
125 per cent between 1990 and 2000 from around 80 Bern to about 180 Bern, 
while the local consumption of oil and petroleum products had increased by 
around 30 per cent over the same period.
The volume of gas reinjected into oil reservoirs to maintain pressure in 
old fields (like most of the region’s fields) in the countries under study jumped 




























































































2000. The reinjected gas is expected to continue growing together with the 
ageing of the oil fields and the installation of facilities for enhanced oil recovery.
The factors that have contributed to the extremely rapid development of 
gas consumption in the Gulf up to now are expected not only to continue but 
even to gather momentum in the coming years. Those factors are essentially the 
sharp growth in energy demand in all countries in the region and the policy of 
substituting gas for oil in domestic energy consumption. Apart from these 
evident economic merits, the policy of utilising natural gas domestically offers 
the advantage for the countries of the region of reducing local demand for crude 
oil, and hence reserving a maximum share of oil production for export.
The growth in gas demand, coupled with supply constraints, is resulting 
into an increasing gas deficit in most of the region’s countries, and a growing 
potential for gas trade within the area, under which non-associated gas-rich 
producers would supply countries or regions with shortfalls. That also would 
lead us to conclude that only the countries in the Gulf with large non-associated 
reserves (Qatar and Iran) are strong candidates to become large gas exporters (if 
they are not already !).
GAS EXPORT
While the domestic gas consumption of the Gulf will not match its gas resources 
in the medium term, only exports to the major consuming zones will allow the 
full utilisation of its reserves. In the mean time, some countries in the region will 
need to import natural gas to meet their demand, whereas other countries will 
acquire gas supplies when acting as intermediary between the gas resources and 
the gas markets providing an important transit function.
In 2000, the Gulf had a very marginal share (6.4 per cent) in the 
international gas trade, limited to flow of LNG export from Abu Dhabi, Qatar 
and Oman to Japan and South Korea (with some spot cargoes to Europe and the 
US), and minor piped volumes from Oman to Ras Al-Khaimah. Some flows 
were limited to national trade (from Sharjah to Dubai and to the other northern 
UAE emirates).
Nevertheless, in the near future, the Gulf would come to play an important 
role on the world gas market. Indeed, the countries of the region possess very 
important assets that should contribute to promote the extension of their trade, 
including an important margin for natural gas exports even with an increase in 
the domestic consumption, and a relative proximity to Europe and Asia, 




























































































enable the countries of the area to develop intensive trading in two main 
directions: regional markets, and interregional trade.
Regional markets could lead to the building of gas pipeline networks 
where rich producers would supply the countries with gas shortfalls. Those 
would include countries in the East Mediterranean (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel, and especially Turkey) and in the Gulf, where some countries have huge 
oil reserves but minor gas reserves, or gas reserves in associated form. Inter- 
regionally, Gulf gas will find opportunities on the three main markets, the Indian 
sub-continent, Asia-Pacific, and Europe, which will show growing deficits in the 
near future.
However, while the importance of gas reserves of the Gulf allows 
optimistic expectations about the development of gas export projects from the 
region, many economic and political constraints will have to be overcome before 
these schemes will see the light. This is especially true for pipeline projects for 
which economic issues are not the only determining factors. Unfortunately, 
although a final peace in the Middle East between the Arabs and Israel (if any) 
will surely shift in the perception of political risk of the area, it will not be able 
to eliminate all of the factors of conflicts and instability within the producing 
countries or the transit states, and the interstate rivalries and disputes in the 
region, which, together with the Arab-Israeli issue, have been behind the shut 
down of many (oil) export pipelines in the Middle East.
Another crucially important exercise consists to know if the oil producing 
and exporting countries in the region find a real interest in encouraging the 
development of natural gas within their territories or in their neighbouring states 
for export into the world energy markets. The divergence in interests between 
countries with large crude oil and (associated) gas reserves (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia) and those with huge non-associated natural gas resources only should be 
taken into consideration. In the region, Qatar represents the only country with 
minor oil reserves, but with large natural gas resources; Iran’s natural gas 
reserves are the second largest in the world, while the country’s oil resources are 
relatively big although produced with the help of secondary and enhanced 
recovery techniques from ageing and maturing fields. The question is to evaluate 
the position of neighbouring countries with huge oil resources towards the states 
that are developing their natural gas reserves, or are planning to do so in the 
future.
In fact, developing an alternative energy source as important as natural 
gas could affect the long-term interests of countries with huge oil reserves in the 
region. Saudi Arabia is a typical example in this case. Indeed, Riyadh has 




























































































such as Qatar, Oman, and Yemen through its territories. Because the price of gas 
is structurally related to that of oil, it has even been thought that the policy of 
low oil price adopted by some countries is partly aimed at handicapping the 
development of natural gas.
In another development, there has been a strong although hidden 
competition between the different gas developers in the region on increasingly 
difficult export outlets. This is especially true in Asia-Pacific, the main niche for 
Gulf LNG, whose export projects have been dependent on supplies to only two 
countries there, namely Japan and South Korea.
Nevertheless, any economic difficulties in Asia-Pacific, like those seen in 
1997-99, or any adverse changes affecting the structure of the gas market there 
(especially the power sector) will have serious implications for existing and 
planned LNG export projects in the Gulf. In fact, the Asian economic crisis in 
the late 1990s has revealed fundamental weaknesses in the economies of the 
region, and major restructuring efforts have been subsequently required to build 
the basis for a sustained and strong recovery.
Forced to look beyond Japan and South Korea for buyers, the gas 
producers in the Gulf are faced with a baleful combination of greater 
competition, shorter contracts, risky markets, lower prices and less creditworthy 
customers. This is especially true for clients in countries such as India.
Meanwhile, the Gulf has been facing a growing competition from the 
LNG developers within the Asia-Pacific region itself. That competition is likely 
to become intense, with the aim to secure the earliest possible place in the area’s 
natural gas market, and with projects trying to avoid being delayed, having also 
in mind that long distance gas pipelines could eventually start competing with 
LNG. Many pipeline projects are now either under construction or consideration 
in the region, and as markets there develop and grow, pipeline imports could 
become a real competitive threat to LNG.
Another challenge to the Gulf could well come from the recent trend of 
seriously exploring for natural gas in the Asia-Pacific region. There is a 
somehow large potential of discovering more resources, which are to add to the 
proven reserves already found in the area (a total of about 10330 Bern in late 
2000, around 7 per cent of the world total, and a 2000 reserves to production 
ratio of 39 years). Until recently, the petroleum industry there had never really 
explored for natural gas as such, the objective has always been oil. Gas reserves 
have typically been found while looking for oil and developed incidentally. Any 
new commercial gas discoveries in Asia-Pacific will be immediately considered 





























































































be seen here as a good example, where increasing gas reserves and p roS ^^ffi ' 
are actually presenting serious challenges for gas import schemes.
Also on the Asia-Pacific scene, natural gas from the Gulf, particularly that 
in LNG form, will surely continue to face growing competition from oil but 
especially from coal. The cost of imported coal, on a thermal value basis, is 
consistently below the price of LNG which is most of the time higher than that 
of imported oil. Nevertheless, while consumers in Asia-Pacific might be willing 
to keep paying a “premium” for natural gas in line with growing concerns in the 
region about the environmental impact of energy production and use, most 
governments in the area continue to see economic growth as their top priority, 
and this together with the availability of relatively cheap coal within the region, 
coupled with clean coal technologies, could limit that “premium”, at least in the 
medium term.
If one or more of those above-mentioned issues came true, Gulf LNG 
could be “reoriented” towards other markets, especially Europe and the US. The 
depressive impacts of such a market supply-demand situation on prices, could 
then “help” the Gulf LNG to acquire a minor but growing share of the European 
market, especially that such prices, compared to those proposed by other 
suppliers, have been hindering the strong entering of Gulf LNG into European 
markets.
It is useful to raise within this context the issue of LNG carriers transiting 
Egypt’s Suez Canal on their way to European markets. In a development related 
to the gas transit role of the Canal, the Suez Canal Authority recently refused to 
grant higher discounts than 35 per cent of transit fees to LNG carriers that are 
going from Qatar (and any other Gulf potential gas exporter) to Europe. That 
discount has been awarded since late 1997 in a bid to win lucrative Gulf gas 
export trade and thwart plans for rival pipelines. But it is highly doubtful that 
this discount policy will continue if Egypt finds that LNG from the Gulf is 
competing with the export prospects of its own products.
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